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Well-known scholars help clear paths to war or peace, tolerance or intolerance, reform or reaction.
They may consciously attempt to provide moral guidance by taking a public stand on political issues, but
their mordI path-finding works primarily tllfOUgh the Lransformation of their scientific and metaphysical
concepts into "folk tlleories"-those simplified and sometimes distorted versions of their ideas that
quietly revolutionize ways of looking at tlle world.
"Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt frOID any intellectual influence. are
llSuiilly the slaves of some defunct economist"-"Tote a famous economist, but the axiom holds true for
highly regarded scientists and writers whatever their field of ex-pertise. But the permeability of
aeademic abstractions into more common conceptions of the world is generilly underestimated, and not
enough attention has been devoted to how such processes actually work-bow abstract ideas, world
evcnts, and common beliefs come together in our minds.
Mental processcs, in what are usually considered widely divergent spheres of human activity such as
scientific theorizing, political activity, and individual moral development most likely do interact, and we
need explanations-hypotheses to work with-that give structure to a variety of inputs, or othemise we
must simply sllfUg our shoulders and allow the crudest of stereotypes and personal presumptions to
prevail. 'That Keynes's line above is so often repeated, with little else more to add, is a good indication
of how little else there is in the popular imagination, besides that lonely phrase, to express a crucial idea.
Yet how the sum of these processes in their cntirety, affcct a society's ethical and intellectual evolution, is
nothing less than the cognitive process of ci\'ilization.
The preliminary sketch offered here for analyzing this process is broadly divided into tltree aspects:
1) the mental habitat of epistemology and metaphor; 2) a phase of coguitive constmction: and 3) moral
resolution and cognitive homeostasis. The analysis tllUS derived indicates that sccmingly scparate arenas
of human endeavor are in fact quite intimately related, and also tlmt the fabric of the big picture of social
forces on the one hand, and tlle tltreads of individual cognition and personal initiative on the other hand,
are seamlessly intem\'ined "itllout reason to believe in any inherent contradiction. Furtllennore. the
approach suggests tllere is no guaranty that intellectual discoveries lead to mental maturity and moral
wisdom among tlle general public, nor even among academicians, and that what science really needs, or
more importantly, what makes tlllit science meaningfully employed, is not so much an understanding of
scientific concepts per se by tlle members of a society, but an understanding of what underlies their own
changing cognitive trends as a community-trends that have the power to transform human endeavor into
sometlling ethical and constructive, or the opposite.
2. An Outline of Cognitive Civilization
2.1 Authoritative Epistemologies
First we consider how epistemological systems-such as that of Plato or Aristotle or Kant-act as an
intellectual and mordI storehouse for the inlagination. partially corresponding to what in cognitive
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linguistics is genernlly called a domain or more specifically an "abstract domain~ (Langacker 1987) and
in mental space theory is called "generic space" (Fauconnier 1997). A domain is the background
knowledge necessary to understand the meaning of a word-based concept, such as "voters," which
requires some comprehension of representative democracy, and an inkling of what the act of voting
entails. Alternatively, a generic space, according to that theory, is the common conceptual background
between "input spaces" from which a "conceptual blend" is concocted. For those who study analogy, it
is the common structure or "analogical abstraction" extracted from the base and target in an act of
"re-representation" (Gentner 2003). That is to say, in order to bring two things together to form a
metaphor or a new concept, there must be some sort of common ground as l.A. Richards (1936) pointed
out long ago; a framework for deriving compatibilities, or else the base and target simply won't hold
together in our minds as a single entity.
2.1.1 Unguistic and Cultural Matrix
BUI whatever inputs have in common, whether it be "western democracies with labor unions and
voters" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002:47) or even "a moving indi\idual and his position" (ibid 2002:41),
these ideas are not necessarily conceived of ill the same way by everyone, particularly across difIerent
languages, as accumulating studies of "ethnosyntax" or cross-culturallinguistics (Enfield 2002, Everett
2005, WierLbicka 1997, Gentner and Goldin-Mcadow 2003, Bowerman and Levinson 2001, Niemeier
and Din'en 2000, Piitz and Verspoor 2000, Gumperz and Levinson 1996) and visual-spatial
conceptualizations show (Kitayama et al 2003, Nisbett, et al. 2001, Anggoro and Gentner 2004, Lucy
1992). Ultimately, the common conceptual background that two "input spaces" supposedly contains
requires a shared cultural-cognitive backgroUIld ofspeaker and listener; without that, the so-called generic
space that the speaker believes e:dsts, exists in his own mind but not necessarily that ofwho is listening.
That is why intercultural communication is difficult; hunlOr often fails to span languages because the
"generic" concepts are simply not generic. And so much more so when it comes to the storehouse of
elaborate cognitive models, or the authoritative epistemologies that exist in different societies, which are
the result of a particular philosophical heritage and an educational system emphasizing those metaphors
over others in a deliberated curriculum for construing the world.
The term "generic space" therefore, is somewhat counterintuitive by the standards of everyday
language; "Generic" COffi'C)'S an impression of plain vanilla knowledge without being culturally bound or
language specific-indeed, the term "Global Generic" is also employed exacerbating that impression. A
global generic goes one step funher back than simple generic space in finding commonalities between
inputs at a more abstract level, and while some of them might be truly universal, others may not be
completely so. Those commonalities include what is "Generic" in the word's original adjectival sense:
characteristic of a broad based class, kin, or genus. or in the case here, of "Genera" implying a shared
system of categorization. Thus the concept of global generic overlaps somewhat "ith what Eleanor
Rorsch (1978), for instance, calls "superordinate" categories (such as the \\ider concept of "furniture"
opposed to the more tangible, basic level of "chair"), or what others call "hypemyrn)~' in a person's
comprehension of the taxonomic hierarchy of the world
Ronald Langacker's (1987) "cognitive grammar" emphasizes the multidimensionality of such
epistemological structure by using the term "matrix" to refer to the set of overlapping domains necessary
to fully grasp the meaning of a concept. To retum to our example, in any given conte>.1, an adequate
comprehension of the term "voters" requires understanding: 1) voting procedure or at least some notion
on a motor level of the act called "voting"; 2) the abstraction known as representative democracy and
assumptions to be made about the level of suffrage lights; 3) the time dependent nature of voter identity
based on elections; and 4) the implied existence of political interests and counterfactual possibilities at
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stake hanging upon the outcome of elections. And we should note here that such concepts, and their
unquestioned validity, are inseparable from the philosophical tenets which uphold thcm.
The point is that dcpending on wherc one grows up, those conceptions 'l\ill vary, and much more so
when it comes to other ideas such as religion and humor. Whether a message employing a particular
concept \\ill travel as intended to another person depends on his matIix of domains being sufficiently
similar to that of the transmitter. John Austin and John Searle havc also spokcn of tile need to acquire
the necess3I)' "background" of Culturally determined meanings to understand words related to the gamc
of "cricket" for instance, as well as less obvious but acquired conceptualizations of gra\ity, space, and
inter-entity relationships tllat underlie the vast array of assumptions we make in daily life (re\iewed in
Taylor 2002).
2.1.2 Cognitive Procedure
Naturally then, even our discussion of the tenn "domain" has its own matrix of background
knowledge or pragmatic presumptions; and if we now shift our perspective to another dontain \\ithin that
lll3trix of understanding, this time to the viewpoint of infomlation processing, it appears that the cognitive
impact of domains is similar to that of "top-do\\n~ infonll3tion processing (versus "bottom up"
processing) on how we interpret any given montage of perceptions. Or redefined in tenns of the science
of memory, these epistemological practiccs are the key intersection points of semantic, declardtive
memory and cognitive, procedural memory that are nurtured within a particular socio-cultural
environment In other words, these menial dC\ices are a combination of 1) interpretive habits and 2)
specific words that are pertinent to those cognitive procedures, which together are distinguishing marks of
a chili7.ation. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) 'l\ith their exposition of linguistically contoured
philosophical meaning, come close to the spirit of tile idea here, that a large part of epistemology is
cognitive custom.
These learned habits are thus similar to the concept of "scripts," "narrative structure," or "genre" as
used in discourse analysis, where a body of infonll3tion has an expected ordering which greatly aids in its
comprehension. And it should be clear that script and genre characteristics lll3y vary with language, just
as the expected format of humor or poetry varies across languages. The development of constmction
grallllllarS in cognitive linguistics, an awakening to the highly idiomatic, procedural lJ.1ture of language, or
the lllaniage of particular meaning with e:\1ended, particular forms, also hints at the idea that
philosophical systems may also have cognitive idioms and genres, which, if we arc familiar with, does
much to aid our comprehension of the line of reasoning, where otllemise, we might be merely S\\imming
in the details.
2.1.3 Identity Constructors
Jacques Lacan's (1991) idea of "master signifier" is useful in explaining the specific words tlmt go
along with those cognitive procedures, although he may have disagreed 'l\ith how he will be presented
here, and thus we \\ill call them "identity constructors." For our purposes, master signifiers or identity
constmctors may be thought of as a particularly key kind of global generic and supcrordill3te category.
They arc the word-eoncepts that are most intimately enrnincd with a person's sense of self-identity-his
"S)mbolic self' to use S. I. Hayakawa's teml (I953~chas national and cultural identifiers, linked to
qualitative descriptors such as concepts of virtue and vice. Lacan considered master signifiers to be
empty significrs, that is signifiers \\ithout a signified (which might also be one way of psychologically
defining Plato's Fonns), and they may be beller defined in terms of the strong emotions they evoke, than
by objective parameters.
These identity constmctors may be said to be nodes in a vast semantic network tied to
autobiographical memory, but as Lacan pointed oul, master signifiers themsclves are beyond
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definition;-they are linguistically bound, intuitive concepts of identity, and thus "shift" together when
the meaning of a master signifier evolves semantically, Lacan spoke of the "master discourse," and the
usc of the word "master~ suggests that these signifiers are treated as unquestioned "givens" in a discourse
revohing around power relationships. If we rnay add another perspective here, they might be called the
cultural counterparts of what Thomas Kuhn (1962) called "received beliefs" in scicnee-the key
underl}ing nodes of a scientific paradigm, but in our case, a cognitive-cnilizational paradigm. Such
identity constructors combine "ith epistemological systems to create powerfully motivating conceptual




































LC: linguistic and cultural epistemological contours of "what we know"
P: cognitive, procedural memory
D: scmantic, declarative memory
ic: identity constructors rb: rcceived beliefs
Id: linked descriptors in the associative network
2.1.4 The Mental Habitat of Cognitive Civilization
To summarize, among varied aspects of perspective, contcxt, category, cognitive procedure. and
identity, it is epistemological frames not only in the intuitive sense that Charles Fillmore (1982) or that
Bartlctt (1932) suggested earlier \'ith his schemas, bUl also formalized knowledge systems, and their
concomitant metaphors, charged with momI content, that we are concerned "ith here. These culturally
and linguistically contoured cpistcmological frameworks reach beyond stationary conceptions of
taxonomy to influence what are seemingly intuitive, immediate, gestalt-like frames of mind-which ifwe
rnay add, arc not so dissimilar to what Tversky and Kalmeman (1983) called "natural assessments" \\ithin
their framework of"heuristic attributes," which \\ill be discussed later.
In the multiplicity of overlapping concepts which stretch before us like a cognitive
chain-"background," "abstract domain." "generic space," and "analogical abstraction";
"perspccli\'ization," "semantic frame," "pragmatic presupposition," and "heuristic attribute"; "paradigm,"
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"metanarrntive." and "Iifeworld"; "genre," "script," "narrative slmcture," and "language game"; "master
signifier," "superordinate category," "hypcrnymy," "maximal scope," and so forlh, not to mention
countless others since eyery scholar employs his own conceptual signature-what is of concern here is
the cultural element threading them together, the quality of historicity (even if recognizably so only when
placed in a rather long time frame) of any concept, and not timeless universalities.
For to put it bluntly, we cannot really do any1hing about the biologically fixed and universal aspects
of cognition, but we can change for the beller or worse those aspects culturally inflnenced. and thm is
why their study is so meaningful. And it is only by thinking about our social problems from the
comprehensiYe perspective of civilization, or the interaction between culture and the direction we head in
as an entire society over time, that we can adequately address the individual's problem as well. Thus,
the cognitive 'zone' we speak of here is that of cognitive civilization.
2.2 'Superordinate' Metaphors
Metaphors come from shared elements of human e:'l:periencc based upon our bodily existence-we
cannot transcend the configuration of our senses. As Joseph Grady (2005) points out, there are
"primary metaphors"-basic, widespread metaphors that arc the building blocks of cognition, embedded
in the norms of our language, conflated with experience from early' childhood. But which particular
metaphors--especially those that are a blend of primary metaphors, i.e., complex mctaphors-eome to be
bestowed with elevated social significance in a society, chosen from the vast repamtof)' of conceptual
possibilities that our bodily existences provide, is a function of ilia! particular culture and its intellectual
leadership, no less so than how gymnastic capabilities, though constrained by the human body, depend
upon which athletic functions arc actually honed by training, practice, and coaching.
2.2,1 Metaphorical Genius as Historical Event
If we survey the history of philosophy, we find that every epistemological framework coJlles with
(:,15)' to grasp metaphors that have made an indelible mark on how people think or once thought And
whether rationalist. empiricist, pragmatic, intuitionist, materialist, or for that maner, even scholastic or
Taoist, we must not forget that incfuidual genius and institutionalized teaching played a role in making
those metaphors canonical.
That goes for Plato and his "Allegof)' of the Cave" where reality is divided between the subterranean
world of perceived shadows and the unseen fi re of truth; the same must be said of the mcdieval geocentric
theof)' of the solar system with Man blessed at the center of all things; and later Descartes and Spinoza
provide us \\ith a metaphor of mind transcending darkness and light, reaching out from the center \\ith
confident geometrical precision in an attempt to replace, \\ith Ille power of the human intellect the
spiritual comfort lost with the disappearance of Man's celestial centrality-images that influenced
cvcf)'thing from the organization of universities to Ille design of military fortresses.
More recently, one can point to Levi-Strauss's architecture of invisible correspondences of meaning
and a sort of 'seeing through to' truth, versus Foucault's archaeological layers of knowledge awaiting
excavation in an almost tactile, multidirectional 'groping for' undcrstanding. Rephrased, we might call
it structuralism's ageless, repetitive, mirroring 'verticality' contrasted to discourse's fluctuating,
time-sensitive 'horizout.1Iity.' Or perhaps we could propose modernism's "solidity" versus
postmodemism's fluidity or rallier "fractality"-;md so forth: these are implicit images-whose precise
conceptuali7.ation may vaf)' with indi\idual illlerpretation, but which nevertheless alIect the general
intellectual climate of the times.
And while the above examples have been taken from the European tradition, we could also look
elsewhere and find other epistemological melaphors, such as that of the luminous "bubble" among the
Jains of India or the "tree of knowledge" spanning the ancient world. All these metaphors, regardless of
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their intuitive basis, owe their birth as elaborate epistemologies to particular individuals, and their fate to
a particular socio-cultural milieu
To summarize, these concepts may be I) explicitly outlined by their creators as in Plato's
epistemological dualism, Aristotle's syllogistic tripartism, or Russell's logical 'atomism'; 2) only implicit
in their philosophical approach as in tlle morc modem examples above of 'axial' oricntation; or 3)
simplified and sometimes interpreted differently from intended. but nevertheless influential as a folk
tradition of knowledge, where epistemology may at times be'iewed with suspicion according to Marx, as
the product of an overweight minority spouting falsehoods from the backs of the emaciated majoril)'; or,
in an earlier age of 'Enlightenlllent' and 'rule of law' in the 18th CClltUI)', to be meekly accepted from a
stem. Moses-like Kant, judging and pronouncing philosophical verdicts like a court magistrate of truth
\\ith his commandments ofPure Reason.
2.2.2 Metaphorical Mode
But they need not be restricted to '1sualized inlages. They may be motor-spatial-time relations or
what some call the "somatosensory molhl1ity" (Damasio 1999)-or what others call "proprioceptal,"
oriemational, or "event-structure concepts" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999}-such as Plato's internally
directed movement, closing in upon truth, an 'inwardness' or analytic introversion; and Aristotlc's
cxternally directed, spreading out and categorically covering tmth, an 'outwardness' or inductive
e:\1l'oversiolL To put it somewhat crudely, these implicit metaphors are readily accessiblc to someone
born blind and deaf, but require the experience of limb extension and bodily movement Other
superordinatc metaphors might require hearing for a musically conccived relation of parts to wholc, or
may evoke a sense of smell to conceptualize intuition and insighl They arc "image schcrnas" (Johnson
1987) but not just any image schcmas; they are those tied together \\1th an epistemological approach often
reflecting an intellcctual style, such as a sensoI)' prcference for vision or hearing, or a psychological
preferencc for system building versus system razing, or holistic versus splitting lmalytic methods. Those
schemas or metaphors may be simple or complcx aggregations; what counts is thcir melding "1th a larger,
formalized philosophical systcm. The reason why the tenn "superordinate" has been employed is because
they arc made for tllC purpose of linking and contrasting superordinatc catcgories.
2.2.3 Metaphorical Status: living, Dead, or Ghost
Somc of thesc mctaphors may originally havc been "livc" or active mctaphors, wherc they arc
consciously understood as being metaphorical; others llIay be assumed to be "dead" or "conventional" in
that they are just taken for granted and indistinguishable from, or absorbed into, the dictionary definition
of the word. But in fact they arc so alive for us that we are unaware of them, as we arc unaware of our
own breathing. They are interchangeable with thc definition of the word itself, as the "leg" of a piano
is;-which however, in VICtorian times were given skirts, and tables long tablecloths that reached to the
floor because of their supposedly 'dead' metaphorical association. Thus we must say that Max Black
(1979) was mistaken to assert that dead metaphors are not metaphors at all; at the very least they are
'ghost metaphors' whose spirits still lurk in the back of our minds.
Perhaps the more meaningful, basie division is one based upon intention; intentional versus
unintentional metaphor, although that might invoke post-modernist wrath. If I say, hey, hey, Ma~ look
at the leg of that piano--lhen once again it is an active metaphor; but if I look at an iIIustrdted dictionary,
it is simply part of the 1lllexciting definitioll. For our purposes, it matters not if these metaphors arc
living, dead, or ghost; or a case of catachrcsis or not; what counts is their power to influence our cognitive
direction as a society. That is the true strcngtll of a civilization's metaphors.
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2.3 The Cognitive 'Kitchen' of the Mind
Next we look at how those ready-made ways of interprelation fuse \,ith infonnation from the real
world in a phase of cognitive formulations. That is, in most instances, the cognitive inputs of experience
and infonnation undergo the process of being interpreted \\ithout a hitch, according to one's preconceived
notions; but at times a clash between such notions and e>;perience arises, or what is sometimes called
cognitive dissonance, originally proposed by the social psychologist Leon Festinger (1957), and since
refined over the years (HamlOn-Jones and Mills 1999). Festinger's foresight, among other things, was
to realize the intertwined nature of motivation, emotion, cognition. and beha\'ior well before the more
recent popularity in the brain sciences of touting the role of emotion in cognition and decision-making.
And with the aid of conceptual blending theory, the manner in which cognitive dissonance tnll1sfonns into
consonance, appears more clearly visible.
These processes are ongoing and simultaneous; both conscious and unconscious; infonnation
accumulates which either reaffinus or contradicts present models of interpretation in the vast kitchen of
the mind A vast "cognitive kitchen" because unresolved issues take time to be transfomled into
something melltally palatable, while other infonnation, from a wide variety of sources I1mt does not
conflict with our preconceived notions, acts as a continuing supply of reassuring nourishment for the
mind just as repla)ing the same tunes docs for us, or hearing news which reinforces our confirmatory
biases. That is, the mind is 'parallel-processing' or rather 'multiple-processing.' Ifwe were to rephrase
the above in the much older tenninology of Kant, the problematic ingredients undergo "reflective
judgment" while reassuring nOlllishment is digested br "determining judgment." Kant's ideas, as Mark
Johnson (1987) perceptively observed are not so dissimilar to contemporary ways of vie\\ing I1le role of
the imagination in mental processing.
Most theories of intellectual and scientific change assume that man's intellectual evolution
progresses for the better whencver theory and data conflict. But unlike Hegel's idea of a grand new
syntheses emerging from opposing social and intellectual currents in an unstoppable flow of Progress, or
Thomas Kuhn's (1962) idea of old scientific paradigms becoming completely replaced by ones which
bener account for new infonnation. or Karl Popper's (1959) Darwinian evolution of knowledge through a
process of weak theory elimination (falsification) toward more interesting problems, in the process of
cognitive construction we propose here, there is no necessary movement towards a resolution Ilmt is more
in tune "ith reality.
2.4 From Moral Resolution to Cognitive Homeostasis
Rather, what happens is a cognitive exploration (not liInited to searching for scientific e"l'lanations)
that results in our psychological satisfaction, and resolves the troublesome sense of contradiction, though
not necessarily the root cause of the contradiction. In other words, the primary mover of intellectual
change in a society is the feeling of irresolution. or cognitive dissonance, rather the actual contradiction
itself. Sometimes it may result in a general sense of intellectual malaise in a society, or may be more
pronounced among its intellectual leaders. If that irresolution is primarily scientific, the cognitive
dissonance may be resolved by the overthrow of an old theory which has becollle untenable in the face of
new facts-as the geocentric theory of the solar system was overthro"n by the heliocentric theory; but at
other times, especially in the case of historical interpretations or ethical issues, where the facts and their
significance are open to debate, it may instead lead to a rC\ision in the way we regard the importance of
those facts themselves.
An old cognitive model may be resurrected or a new one lIIay be synthesized from pre-cxisting
ideas in a process analogous to "conceptual blending" (Fauconuier and Turner 2002). Conceptual
schemas interact nith problematic constructs, and it is this process which works as a forceful mechanism
of resolving 1II0rai dissonance, rather than, as is commonly believed, by logical and self-consciolls ethical
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reasoning, or by a process of probabilistic Bayesian inference, incrementally conditioning past belief.
The ethical homeostasis of a society is thus often achieved with the help of a mental 'jump' into cognili\'e
comfort, rather tJlan resolved by responsible acts of restitution. When there is no "cognitive polieeman."
so as to speak. who is in a position to chide us into remorse (perhaps because we ourselves have taken on
the role of world policeman), we may, like a child who corrects his own school papers, do so in a way that
suits how we would like to see ourselves.
3, Metaphorical Currency/Frequency
3.1 'Conscience Saving' Metaphors
Our point of concern here is not only 'conceptual blending' per se, but its involvement as a
mechanism by which moral issues are resolved by a society-resolved not on the basis of logical and
ethical political decisions-but by tlle use of such cognitive blending/emotional transference devices.
Instead of directly addressing the contradiction between image and reality by taking steps to bring image
in line \\ith reality, or ,ice versa, the definition of reality itself may be simply changed.
It is precisely in this aspect that scholarship eXtends, from its narrow and specialized basis, to playa
significant role in the construction of a larger ethical framework, as well as act to channel the general
moral direction of a society. For in order to succeed in what will be accepted as a legitimate leap of the
ethical imagination, a cognitive synthesis-olle that is capable of commanding respect-of what arc very
different mental constructs "imout intrinsic relation, may be necessary. And while mose links might at
first glance seem somewhat arbitrary, but mey become over time the cognitive axis around which
common sense revolves, and me basis for deeming whatever is unlike itself to be arbitrary instead.
That mental act of construction depends upon I) me prestige and epistemological status of the
'conscience-saving metaphor' \\ithin a cullUIal tradition, such as the authority that Plato (and his cOllcept
of mankind seeing only the flickering shadows ofa morc awesome reality) or Aristotle (and his syllogistic
approach) may confer upon a given ethical situation, and 2) how widespread the mental habit of appl)ing
such a metaphor actually is in a particular society. This may be called its metaphorical currency, or
alternatively, its metaphorical frequency, mearured by how eX1ensive its current application is in
scientific, social, and folk meories, and its propagation at institutions of higher education \\itlJin that
society.
3.2 'canonical' versus 'Quaint' Metaphors
Whemer a metaphor is comincing or sounds quaint is a function of how academic leadership treats
it. A quaint metaphor, like one which compares the universe to a clock or the body to an engine may
have been born much latcr in human history than one which compares reality to shadows in a cave--yet
me latter can possess a greater currency today because it has gone through the printing press of modem
scholarship. A quaint metaphor on the other hand, acquires the noticeable patina of an antique, and
comes to sound trite and ineffectual, despite tJle fact it lIIay actually be younger and of no less intrinsic
value.
The higher the degree of intellectual or political authority, and the more "idely recognized that
authority is, tJle more decisive is the stamp of approval, as any social psychology textbook tells us about
the power of demagogues or white-gowned scientist look-alikes; and we assulIle it to be true, and that
such authority partakes in our conceptual fornllllations and tJleir entrenchment. Likewise. me denial of
an epistemological tradition by highly regardec thinkers may become me crack which fissures into a
socio-intellectual transformation of greater proportions.
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3.3 Schema Extension, Metaphorical Memesis, and Emergence
While a single authoritative application of a metaphor may not be the only reason a certain way of
thinking crystallizes in a society, it seems more logical than not to believe it is a contributory causc, either
as provocation to the formulation of new ideas or as buttressing reinforcement to pre-existing thought.
Superordinate metaphors and epistemological frames, should they be made fashionable and respectable
by intellectual authority, are by their very nature prone to new applications or employed to reinforce old
ideas. Indeed, the whole process of lexical evolution points to this mechanism. In terms of cognitive
grammar, tlle relationship of such metaphorical applications functions as a sanctioning Uprototype~
lending itself to "ex1ensions" and the reinforcement of the "schema" (Langacker 1993), and its eventual
"entrenchment." Within the framework of the ~usage based model" in linguistics, a philosophical
metaphor lIIay be considered a cognitive unit resembling an extended granunatical schema where
applications contribute to determining low or high conceptual type frequencies and their general
"produethity." (Bybee and Thompson 1997).
Along similar lipes. but from yet a different, earlier perspective, Richard Dawkins (1976), taking
from Greek dr,una "mime" which has come to mean mimic or imitate, proposcd tlle tenn "meme"
rhyming with "gene," to describe easily transferable non-material entities such as ideas, songs, dances, or
any recognizably differentiated and self-<:ontained cultural unit. He proposed that memes compete with
other memes in a Danlinian struggle to propagate themselves at the expense of others, just as genes do.
Thus he literally proposed that ideas have a life of their OWll; Terence Deacon (1997) proposed much the
same with the idea of "language as a virus."
Another way therefore, of defining the strength of metaphors is their potential degree of mimesis;
perhaps it is their highly "memetic" nature which charms us. Vivid, active, or effective metaphor may
imply memetic susceptibility; which has always been implicitly understood in everyday language as the
ability of something to "capture our imagination." Even in philosophy we sec how better arguments can
be defeated by more "contagious" ones. Thus John Searle is probably better knO\ll1 and more ofi-quoted
for his "Chinese Room." William Ockham for his "Razor," Thomas Nagel for his "Bat" and Luch\ig
Wingenstein for his "Family Resemblances" than the rest of their theories combined. Though we need
not take the biological analogy literdlly, metaphorical mimesis is not to be underestimated, nor the role of
intellectual authority as "contagion source".
Of course, not everyone reads philosophy or linguistics, not directly, no more than they do the
special theol)' of relat"'ity; but nevenheless the average person does have a vague awareness of such
things which become part of his worlmiew. And if not directly, in a process somewhat analogous to
how in game theory an individual's "higher order beliefs," or beliefs about other people's beliefs, are
linked to individual and group behavior, so too, a superordinate metaphor works its way indirectly as well
as directly in creating the emergent, cognitive climate of what is called chilization.
4. I-Language and E-Language
As an example we take Chomsky's widely accepted conception of language: a dhision between
"I-language" and "E-Ianguage:' I-language is internal and innate to every individual, an idealized
language system, universal and abstract in nature, and based in tIle biology of the brain. It is what we
are capable of and what we instinctively understand is right-i.e., our ~competence," although at times
we migllt err. When we do err, we are in the world of E-language--extemal, extensional. expressed
language-the vast, messy OUlput of verbiage we hear all around liS, often in lmgralllmatical and chaotic
form: the "perfonnance" of everyday language. How;:ver simplified, this in a nutshell, is Chomsky's
manner of defining the rcality of language. Next, keeping these epistemological di\isions in mind, lI'e





Let us first look at "Plato's Problem." Plato's problem is the philosophical preoccupation with
delving into why we arc capable of knO\\1ng so much, of understanding the mysteries of the mind and
universe, despite our bound and limited existence as human beings. It harks back to Plato's ancient idea
of timeless, perfect imisible '~Fornls"; what we see around us are only degraded, imperfect examples of
those ideal fonns. However familiar these concepts llIay be to us, it is worthwhile re\ie\\ing them
briefly. Plato used an allegory of men in a cave who face a wall and see the shadows of things. but not
the things themselves in the light of the fire. For iustancc, take the idea of Circle-no matter what
picture of a circle we may draw or find printed on paper, however round it looks at first glancc, if we
view it "ith a microscope we "ill never find a perfect circle. NC\'ertheless, we comprehend the ideal
fonn of Circle, even if we have never seen one, According to Plato, we understand these concepts
because somewhere inside us, though not always easy to discern, we already possess that knowledge.
Plato's Forms are abstract knowledge, invisible and innate, ultimately accessible 10 human understanding.
whose illumination is the responsibility of the philosopher. They are tme knowledge, more valuable
than the knowledge ofthings we experience, which are after all, mere shadows of the truth. The ancient
philosopher, or his modem academic counterpart, sees clearly in his mind's eye what others only vaguely
scnse, ifat all.
Now, if we take the example of language, Plato's Fonn of language would be somewhat analogous
to Chomsky's idea of I-language; while the flickering shadows of reality are analogous to Chomsk)"S
E·language of superabundant babbling. We might make some fine distinctions between Chomsk)"s and
Plato's \iews, but it can be safely said Chomsky generally agrees with the spirit of Plato's idea. Indeed,
Chomsky sees children's acquisition of language in the same light as Plato; "ithout postulating
foreknowledge, the child's quick acquisition of gramlllar is all but miraculous, and therefore must be
innate and universal.
4.2 Orwell's Problem
Orwell's Problem on the other hand. is the qucstion of why, despite man's scientific and
philosophical powers to glean insights into the nature of the cosmos and faraway galaxies (even young
children can learn something as cOlllplex as a language), at the same time, we human beings understand
so linle about OUI own human society, and can be so easily dcceived about its ugly realities~ven when
the facts are staring us in the face.
According to Chomsky, the dismal reality of institutional propaganda-as portrayed in George
Om'ell's novel 1984. grinds down our mental capacity to see clearly, and herds us into a 'manufactured'
consensus of political opinions. "Manuf.1ctured" because, as in Omcll's nightmarish novel, totalitarian
government achievcs compliance by controlling every facet of a citizen's mentallifc-all infonnation and
media. Ideas arc reformaned and broadcast in a brain-numbing. automated "Newspeak," not so
dissimilar to the Machiavellian double talk today of modem politicians amplified \13 the mass media.
Chomsky conceives of Orwell's problcm as a result of deep, multiple linkages in corporate avarice and
media distortion. government corruption and military adventurism, and so forth-concrete problems of
money, power, and people. Like Plato believed, the real world is much less beautiful than the realm of
ideas; and because these political problems exist at a mundane social level, thcir resolution is primarily
the responsibility of the average citizen and politician, with the scientist working in an auxiliary role.
4,3 Orwell's Problem as Plato's Problem
Thus Chomsky sees the problems of Plato and Orwcll as existing in two separate departments of
lnunan knowlcdge. But underneath, they lIlay be linkcd 1Il0re strongly tlmn he wishes to believe, for the
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pursuit of Platonic vision is not simply impeded by institutional obstructions such as politics and
bureaucracy as claimed by Chomsky. The reverse is also true: the institutional obstructions and the
manipulation of mass opinion as outlined by Omell hinges upon a Platonizing form of mental abstraction,
where reality is lffiided into separate, compartmentalized domains that do not cross over into the other.
That is to say. mass opinion is herded by the sanctioning of epistemological schemas where
concepts are defined to be separate from experience. The higher reality of 'T' good consecrates the
doctrine of lesser or "necessary e\ils"-which are a reality of ouly secondary "E" degree. Injustice,
even when identified, falls on deaf ears because reconciliation between the two spheres of reality is
wmecessary in this epistemological ordering. Thus Plato's problem-the pursuit of scientific truth-is
not simply impeded by Omell's problem: the resolution of Omell 's problem-the clearing of obfuscation
surrounding political reality-is also impeded by Plato's approach, by the "idespread habit of emplo)ing
on a grand scale the conceptual metaphor of Plato's Forms.
4.4 I-America and E-America
Or in other words, if there exists an 'I-Language' versus an 'E-Language.' so there exists an
'I-America' versus an 'E-America' in the minds of many Americ.1ns. I-America is the internalized.
idealized, and Platonic ideal of America; while E-America is the external, e:\;perienced. evcryday, and
excusable America. This conccption of knowlcdge, where we can isolate and idealizc things rather !lJan
accept the empirical truth as it is, and thus continue to believe in a world of Platonic perfection entirely
different from what we observe and experience daily, is why the "manufacture of consent" which
Chomsky rails at works so well-and cannot occur "ithom it.
In terms of cognitive grammar, "I-LanguageJE-Language," in a process similar to that of category
e:>.1ension.. acts as the canonical "prototype" which activates the domJant Platonic "schema" sanctioning









It is precisely because the average American holds the samc attitude toward his country as
Chomsk)' docs toward language, that the political problems Chomsky rails at will never be resolved.
Chomsky (1986) says "Plato's problem is deep and intellectuall)' exciting; Orwell's problem., in contrast.
seems to me much less so." Likewise the average American says: 'l-America's problem is deep and
intellectually exciting; E-America's problem, in contra..<t, seems to me much less so.' And it is natural
that such a \ie"1JOint seeks a higher reassurance and congruence with the larger totality of authoritative
knowledge. That is to say. such an intellectual coup de force must be underpinned by a \\idely aecepted
epistcmological approach, blessed by that society's most respected intellectual leaders.
Thus Chomsky's conscientious, but mcntally compartmentalized social activism can never
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overcome the apathy of the majority of people over the questionable activities of E-Arnerica. Perhaps
more imponalllly. it is why educated leaders in the diplomatic and intelligence community, mostly
educated at the best private universities in America, arc \\illing to commit a thousand misdeeds as part of
E-America for Ule sake of the one eternal principle of I-America, and why they are \\ithout remorse for
all their misdeeds. I-America is their raison d'etre, Uleir pride as the intellectual elite capable of
comprehending Ule Platonic form of America, and to administer on behalf of the ignorant E-populace. It
is part of their intellectual culture, and they admire minds like Chomsky's, regardless of how they might
disagree \\ith his politics. It is no coincidence tlJat with a metaphysical outlook as that of Plato's, whose
conception of an ideal republic was one controlled by an oligarchy of elite philosophers capable of
comprehending Ute ideal state, or ,ol-Republic," the guardians of "I-America" today would also sec
Utemselvcs as an elite oligarchy free of the nomtallegaI restrictions which exist for Utose less enlightened
citizens unable to see Ute importance of a higher mission. Ironic as it may seem, Chomsky's bifurcation
of interests, and the gmin of his scholarship, are riot entirely at odds wiUt Ule very Orwellian problem he
criticizes. Maybe it is for that reason a strdnge sort of immunity works on behalf of Chomsky, where for
other men, sa}ing similar things, there often seerns to be a much lesser tolerance.
4,5 Sehematizing Cognitive Civilization
In Figure 3, we diagram the ideas discussed above, where intellectual and psychological
satisfaction is achieved by the mapping of authoritative metaphors on to cognitive trouble spots by which
ethical and cognitive irresolution is dissolved; Ille emotional source of dissonance is transferred to the
new mofaI constru~ without need for behavioral adjustment In the example pro\ided here, widely
held preconceptions and cherished images of one's own country, fostered by education and stereot)-pcs
passed dO\\n from friends and family, clash witl] disturbing news, information, and everyday experience
which contradicts those preconceived notions. That news may be about war, social conditions, or public
policy that creates the need for a means of resolution, a solution whose validity is confimled by its
reassuringly widespread occurrence among Ule general population, or at least among an element of the
population one identifies with, such as an elite cadre of officials or executives, if one happens to be by
chance, a public official or business executive.
It is here where conceptual blending occurs \ia a suitable epistemology of interpreting the world,
allowing an emotional disassociation from Utose aspects of oneself or those a.'ipeCts of one's country or
group that are causing cognitive dissommce. For perspective, we should note Utat Utis phenomenon has
strong parallels to what in psychodynamics is called I) projective identification or transference, 2)
defensive splitting, and 3) disassociation (sec Appendix B. for further discussion). In particular, we
might mention Ute psychologist Heinz Kohut's (1971) version of defensive splitting where an
exhibitionistic and e:\-pansive "grandiose self' is projected into an internalized object that acts to fuel
ambition, separated from feelings of inadequacy. But in this case, the fantasy of Ute perfect self, ralller
than gradually being tamed by reality, comes to be crystal1ized in Platonic purity thanks to !lIe
superordinate metaphor. Painful elements asso:iated with the self are relegated to what in !llis case is
"E-America" and Utus what would otherwise need to be suppressed can be accepted as a reality of a
second order, while Ute self as "I-America" continues to shine undiminished.
But as the old saying goes, all that glitters is not gold; Illerc is a dark side to what Faucolmier and
Turner call identity "compression" and "decompression." We can tout how Ule compression of \ita!
relations leads to "global insight, human-scale lmderslallding, and new meaning" (2002:92), but the same
processes can also lead to overweening insight, global-scale misunderstanding, and distorted meaning.
In the case illustrated here, a "non-elashing double scope network~-a kirId of blend wherc two separate
but mutually enhancing conceptual referents create more than the sum of their pans-powerfully
reinforces moral and political lapses of responsibility.
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Figure 3. Emotionally Charged "Motivated Blending"
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Construct Two' Juxtapositi of Clashing Inputs.



















5. Metaphor, Memory, and Moral Sentiment
5.1 The Memory Encrustation of Metaphor
In the preceding example, memory may be embellished. distorted. and suppressed in a variety of
ways (as outlined by Schacter and Scarry 2000). Those mechanisms include "confirmatory bias," or the
tendency to selectively focus upon certain pieces of information and not others to reinforce cherished
notions; and at the otller end of the spectrum, "change blindness," or the inability to notice even
fWIClamental changes in ones environment; sometimes even the person one is speaking to can be mitchcd
without the test subject noticing (Simons and Levin 1998, Rensink 2002). It usually occurs at a higher
rate of incidence among the older than Y01mger, perhaps because systetns of categorization have solidified
to the point where they may dominate perceptions.
In certain types of conccptual blends, "compression" may encourage "confirmatory bias" towards
certain events which arc easily recalled and reinforced as long teml memory; while "decompression" of
features or information which are incongruous with the blend may be ignored, creating a situation
conducive to "change blindness." Recent studies do show that visual memory, for example, is enhanced
by blocking out so-called "irrelevant" items (Vogel et. al. 2005). Thus the ease with which we
remember things is linked to our ability not to remember other things-but in fact what we consider
irrelevant information is simply a matter of the priorities our cognitive models provide. Studies of
autobiographical memory (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000, Woike et al. 1999) indicate much the same,
that it is our conceptions of self-identity that shape our memories and animate our goals.
That is to say, metaphor as self-concept can shape the topology of memory because memory is
mapped, or encoded on to the superordinate metaphor in what are sometimes referred to as memory
organizing schemas, which figuratively speaking, act as a "rallying flag" around which memories are
"regimcnted" Certain memories are consolidated, cohesive, and easily recalled, and the associative
network is strengthened by what is known as elaborative rehearsal and maintenance. In that sense, it is
the superordinate metaphor that determines the activation of what is called in memory research the
"consoUdation s"itch" to long term memory. Other information passing directly through short teml
memory is "shallow encoded" and dispersed becoming only dimly recognizable if at all; and any logical
connections there might be between those pieces of information are ignored.
Events that reinforce established conceptualizations of the self are experienced and .then recalled in
a deeply satisfying way, "as if one were there" in vivid sensory detail; while those that detract from it are
viewed as if one were regarding the matter from afar (D'Argembeau et al. 2002). By this process, a
conceptual abstraction may become more seemingly real by its association "ith vivid memories, while
the real, by being remembered in a rather detached fashion, may become more seemingly abstracL
Therefore, what counts is not simply if a metaphor is active or not, but how long it has been active to a
particular individual, and what it represents. Over tinle, it becomes encrusted "ith additional sentiments,
linked to a hlUldred experiences, triggering certain memories but not others, Uke the airUne stickers on a
suitcase that has e;.;perienced a hundred trips with its owner. Metaphors arc not simply elIective or less
effective due to the nature of the metaphor itself, they are Uked and disliked, fondly remembered or
despised because of the interaction between the metaphor and personal c;.;perience once that metaphor has
been internalized.
5,2 An Oddly Cut Gem: Social Emotions via Moral Refractions
From the point of view of memory, a superordinate metaphor may be somewhat Uke a nostalgic old
suitcase, and at other times, like a flag around which memories are regimentcd. But regarded from the
perspective of emotion, it may be better compared to a large, oddly cut gem, because a superordinate
metaphor's components, such as the I-America and E-America facets, refract emotions differently. Such
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metaphors aid in structuring our emotions, and give those emotions a greater or lesser moral significance.
On onc hancL the cmotive-epistemic configuration of the superordinate mctaphor may work to
dampen certain emotional signals tJl3t would usually lead someone to interpret infomlation as a problem
requiring resolution. For instancc, things we confront in Iifc such as thc suffering of others. or one's
0\\11 unethical conduct (those events are sometimes called the emotional competent stimulus or ECS in
social neuroscicnce), both which should bring about a moral response, fail to trigger 1) the appropriate
degree of social emotion, such as compassion or guilt, and 2) the confrontation ~ith moral
decision-making they demand. And thus in tmn, there is a failure to steer behm;or in an ethical
direction.
However, in other situations, the reverse occurs: the emotional sigTl31 is amplificd by tl13t
metaphoric structure. Self-pride, for instance, when one makes some son of philanthropic contnlmtion
to others, or contempt for other lI.1tions when they violate accepted nomlS, might be excessively
stimulated, followed by an excessive behavioral response. Thus the specific composition of the
superordinate metaphor exacerbates tJle lopsidedness of moral responses, skc\\;ng "emotional
intelligence."
5.3 'Hot' and 'Cold' Metaphors
A,i,id., if simple, example of this sort of metaphorical control over our emotions comes from what
might at first seem an unrelated field of research: "gratification delay:' Yet perhaps nothing bener
reveals the power of metaphor to control emotional response than wll3t researehers call "hot" and ~cold"
cognition (Metcalfe and l\.fisehel 1999). a mental technique to boost the ability to delay gratification for
food by imagining, for instance, pretzels as brown logs or marshmallows as puffy douds-Le., by
metaphorical suggestion. Among a host of techniques of gratification delay, tJtis was the most effective:
cognitively morphing tJle desired into something inedible but which nevertheless shared somc
characteristics w;th the food's appearance, therefore inviting one to engage in active. symbolic
reconstruction.
The implications of what we might call "hot and cold metaphors" extend beyond achie,ing delayed
gratification; they reveal basic processes at work between cognition, motivation. behavior. moral restraint,
and the power of metaphor to reshape them all. lf cooling or heating metaphors are common within
language, and reflect a standard approach to conceptualization, then hot and cold cognition in faCt,
provide further C\idence of the abilil)' of language to influence not only cognition, but the wellsprings of
basic drives. But in one sense, this is hardly a new discoveI)'; cold cognition is simply another way of
defining what has been well understood for centuries in meditative practices such as tJle "koan" of Zen
Buddhism. As for hot cognition, metaphors have been documented as a motivating mechanism in
education (petrie and Oshlag 1979), to name but one example. Hot cognition can be cooled, but cool
cognition can be sloked with metaphor into hot imagination.
Indeed., much of hwnan emotional adjustment and decision making can be called a function of this
two directional, or two-tap nature of conceptual displacement using metaphorical stimulation or
tranquiIization. They have functioned so in religion sincc time immemorial: from tJle prehistoric days of
Earth as mother goddess, to later religions with heavenly sleep and hellish fire. And naturally, different
combinations of hot and cold metaphors in conjunction willi epistemological frameworks-Leo
superordinate metaphors such as Plato's allegory of the cave ~ith its cool sll3dows of ex-perience and fire
lit truth-produce different emotional responses to the world
5.4 Universal Ethics 'versus' Superordinate Metaphor
Self-serving metaphorical abstractions may pre-empt or even replace what the psychologist
Lawrence Kohlberg once called (he highest stage of moral devclopment: ethical decisions made on the
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basis of universal principles. For what KoWberg failed to realize was that tlle conception of universality
itself is modulated by the epistemological and metaphorical storehouse of the society one grows up in.
In a fine rephrnsing of Plato, Kohlberg stated confidently that, "yOUtllS who understand juslice act more
justly, and tlle man who llIIderstands justice helps create a moral climate" (Kohlberg 1968); but the point
is such a man can only act more justly in accordance wiili his conception of what universality is, nurtured
by a particular moral climate. Depending on the canonical metaphors of a society, what we might call
ilie genernllevel of an individual's 'intersubjective' moral awareness, or his cognizance of a perspective
which is neitller only his nor only the other's. but is sensitive to the existence of interactive effects upon
entities of equal relevance-to simplify philosopher Martin Buber's "1 and Thou" (later refonnulated by
psychologist Martin Hoffman, 2000)-may be eiilier increased or reduced. This is anoilier way of
saying that one of humanity's most redeeming characteristics, a sense of conscience, might be heightened
or dimmed by tlle cognitive characteristics of a society.
The superordinate metaphor functions as tlle moral counterpart of ilie "heuristic attribute" that
Kahneman (2002) speaks of, \\iili which we judge things (ranging from physical measurements to causal
relationships) intuitively, and often mistakenly. In oilier words, ilie superordinate metaphor acts as a
'mornl heuristic.' As ilie emotional yardstick \\ith which moral judgments are made, when two things of
equal ethical significance arc placed witltin its framework, or occur at tlle same frequency, tlle moral
heuristic makes one seem more serious or more frequently occuning than tlle oilier. At best, the
superordinate metaphor works as an "availability" or "anchor" heuristic; at worst, it becomes a
"contagion" heuristic condoning cven atrocities in a schema of moral "accounting" lending credence to
the ide.1 that on tlle whole, or in ilie balance, one is always justified in one's decisions and actions.
Thus deviations in justice do not occur simply llIIder extreme circumstances such as tlle "fog of
war" or because of "group iliink" or obedience to authority as demonstrnted maIlY years ago in controlled
e:qleriments by Stanley Milgram (1965) at Yale or in later eX'Periments at Stanford, or recent analyses of
prisoner torture in Irnq; they arc also linked to foundational conceptions of reality, which given any set of
circumstances, make certain tllings sccm somewhat more or less pennissible for an entire community.
5,5 Cognitive Grammar as a Theory of Human Nature
The idea that epistemological conceptions of reality shape one's sense of appropriate moral
conduct seems to be substantiated from psychological studies of "implicit theories" about human nature
that people hold. Beliefs that human nature be conceived as a single, changeless entil)' (I.e.,
fundamentally fixed) or incrementally formed (I.e., malleable}-Ieads to divergent mornI judgments and
responses. In controlled studies, ilie manner in which subjects respond to negative behavior of otllers
varies wiili tlle type of implicit ilieory iliey adhere to. Entil)' ilieorists tend towards global judgments of
"evil" and calls for "punishment" while tllose who hold incremental moral schemas attempt to understand
reasons, conduct process analyses, and recommcnd education or rehabilitation (Dweck 1996, Ross 1989).
These implicit conceptualizations of hlllllan nature have been found not only to reflect moral views, but
also personalil)' charncteristics and goal organization.
Interestingly, tllese differences in entity versus process interpretations of human nature have their
analogies in semantic structure. between, for instance, "nominal" versus "relational" predications of
impl)ing tlle same objective situation, such as ilie words "group" versus "together"; "circlc" vcrsus
"round"; or "explosion versus explode"; to use Rouald Langacker's (2002) examples. In casual terms.
they might be called a diffcrence in emphasizing ilie "nouniness" vcrsus tlle "verbiness" of
something-although not quite. More accurately, as Langacker (2002) points out, nominal predications
presuppose tlle interconnections among a set of entities; highlighting, or "profiling" the region thus
established. Relational predication, 011 the oilier hand, presupposes a set of entities, and proliles the
interconnections among tlle entitics.
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In the case of "group" (nomill.llizing) versus "together" (relational) to describe a nwnber of people
in the same place, nominal predication may bc said to implicitly assumc an idea of togcthemess as
samcness, compared 10 a relational approach. As Figure 4 illustratcs, to refer to "a group of thrcc
peoplc" vcrsus "thrcc people togcthcr" is to say the samc thing in tcnus of referential content or
functiOll.l1 equivalence, but arc different approaches to conceptuali711tion, just as it is to rcfcr to people in
nOmill.ll IcmlS of "cvil" versus in tenus of an action chain. To label members of a society "a bad group"
or "people doing somcthing wrong together" rcprescnt diffcrcnt moral sensibilities. In the former, there
is a tcndency towards "bounding" or creating boundaries in an "ethics of summary scarming" of sorts; in
the later a focus on their interactions as separate indhiduals, in an "ethics of sequential scanning."
Cognith'e linguistics can thus offer intriguing moral-eognitivc hypotheses, and testing needs to be
conducted whether peoplc with "cntity" implicit theories versus those with "process" implicit theories of
hwnan nature cxhibit finer linguistic correspondences as well. But rather than simply test the diffcrence
between thc two e:\1rcmes of "cntity" versus "process," it may also be interesting to probe a wider rangc
of possibilities such as "entity" versus "thing" conceptualizations of other human beings, or "complex
atemporal relations" versus "process" \iews of morility, for instance.
Figure 4.
Conceptual Predication and the Perceived Contours of Moral Responsibility
Rclational predication: "together" Nominal predication: "group"
e1,e2' e3 : cognitive events which constitute the crnception of three participating individuals
e01' es,e6 : cogniti\'e events which constitute the COllC<.'Ption of operations responsible
for establishing interconnections between each pair ofparticipating individWlls
Based on Langacker (2002)
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6. Body Politic as an Expression of Cognitive Civilization
Morality may thus be conceptualized in different ways; and so too can nations, which arc obviously
"imagined communities" (Anderson 1983) to their participants, who can only come to know but a small
fraction of their fellow citizens, and fathom only a modicum of the myriad aspects of what constitutes a
"nation." But more importantly, imagined communities are not being imagined in the same way
everywhere, in a kind of globalization of manufactured nationhoods, as outlined in Anderson's
well-Imoml treatise.
Nor are ail nations spinning out "invented traditions" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) with the same
speed; some countries actually do experience a rapid decline in au/hemic traditions. Indeed, the very
opposite of what was diagrammed earlier may be said to be going on in certain nations, where they see
their cultural self as E-reality \\ithout an I-counterpart. or are hcrded along into accepting the I-America,
E-America dichotomy, subsumed into it as peripheraL satclIitc identities in a dmmward spiral of lowcred
self-esteem and selective, negative memory (sec Tafarodi, Marshall, and Milne 2003).
According to thc belief-disconfimJation paradigm (Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999) of tlle tllCOl)' of
cognitive dissonancc, the attempt to cognitively subsUllle othcrs into onc's worhniew is precisely what
happens when a group feels their belicfs contradicted by information: they reinforce each other's beliefs
and proceed to cngage in substantial proselytizing to persuadc others of those vicws-to ""in hearts and
minds"-and thcrcby rcaffinn thcir self-conceptllalizations, eliminating global cmbarrassment and the
cognitivc source of thc finger pointing at t11CIll. If the group is small, like a political cabal, as in thc case
of the attempted "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba during tllC Kcnnedy administration, it rnay end up in
critical self-reevaIu.1tion; if the group is much larger, it may simply lead to ever increasing cfforts at
global persuasion.
Thus our beliefs and our assessments of the moral naturc of war and peace, or of self and nation,
arc not primarily dictated by self-regulating systems of logic-based appraisal. Metaphor stwnps our
logic, Transfixed by il, our ability to sec information for what it is wanes. Baycsian inference, for
instance, is not so much inaccurate, as not allowed to reccive ilS signals to operate, for we can rationally
choose only from what we emotionally can see. Or in other words, evidence and infomlation that
pertains to a belicf is not necessarily thc main force of belief change: it is pre-empted by superordinate
metaphor which may cloud the significance of data so tlmt wc become morally "data blind" or at least
cthically near-sightcd to thc cx1reme,
In decision-making by nations, cpistcmology and mctaphor become part of thc mix of 1) reasoning
strategy, 2) irnagCl)' of future outcomcs and goals, and 3) emotional characterization of prior e:l.-periences
in comparable situations-the three key elcmcnlS (as DarlJasio suggests) that produce what is considered
to be a rational, collective decision. The cognitivc packagc of I-Amcrica arid E-Amcrica, for instancc,
may work to re-clcct certain presidents and prolong a coursc of action, such as war in lie face of what
would othcrwise bc sclf-e\idenl, contradictory challiS of rcasoning about thc faclS and motivcs for
initiating that action.
7. Morals as Metonymy
It should bc ob\ious that thc specific tCmlS "I-Amcrica" and "E-America" do not exist any morc
than the terms "I-Language" and "E-Languagc" exist for thc majority of thc population. BOtll pairs of
concepts arc commonly knmm by thcir metoll}'Il\S, or abbrcviatcd form: simply "America" for both "I"
and "E" America; and "Language" for botli "r and "E" Language. Nevertllcless, these metaphysical
differences do exist as a reality in thc minds of their advocates, a reality confirmed by seeing the
reflection of that belief in the in13gc of tlle other, and in thc larger schema of academic lmowledge,
political spct.'Chwriting, and assumptions made in the mass mcdia-whose contradictions can hardly be
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handled sanely otherwise. In temlS of cognitive gmmrnar. we may say that I-America is the "active
zOlle" of what might be called a broader range of possible conceptions of America.
Because "I-America" and "E-America" appear the same in everyday language, that allows for
homonymic manipulation by politicians or scholars pla}ing on the confusion of same sounding words thaI
mean quite diITerent things. What unites them in lheir efforts is an epistemological framework thal
allows infomlation which detracts from the preferred ideal to be automatically categorized as of lesser
significancc-"shallow encoded"-eompared to that which enhances it. The fonner arc by rule the
exception, the laner the nonn These verbal ellipses exacerbate "change blindness" towards the
fllIldamental nature of society, even when it shifts noticeably away from its own declared principles. In
other words, while "conscious polysemy," or openly recognized multiple meanings in one word. is not an
issue in achieving accurate communication, on the other hand, llIIconscious. or manipulative polysemy. is
a serious socio-political problem.
Madeleine Albright, one time Secretary of State, echoing her President, Bill Clinton (both steeped
in the Platonic university tradition), may be called exemplary of this attitude, and in the use of
homon)mic manipuiatiOll Prefacing her comments in an interview with the standard assertion that
everything possible was being done to avoid militar)' conflict, she concluded:
"But ifwe have to use force,
it is because we arc America
We are the indispensable nation."(A1bright, NBC 1998)
Or 'restored':
"But if we have to use force as E-America,
it is because we are I-America.
We arc the indispensable I-nation..'
Force in other words, is excusable because I-America is the ultimate benchmark for which force cxists to
be used. But withoUI the concept of dualistic rcality, the phrase is tmly a meaningless solipsism. The
senlence works as a convincing public stalement because there is an implicit and widely understood
"indexicality" which revolves around an inlpregnable absU"actioll Like\\ise when President George W.
Bush said in response to the national tragedy of 9/11:
"Like most Americans,
I just can't belie\'c it
because I know how good we are"(in Buchanan 2002)
What he aClually means is probably:
"Like most Americans (who believe in I-America over E-America),
I just can't believe it (what happened in E-America)
because I know how good we (as I-America) are."
ThaI is 10 say. in spite of the possibility that what happened to E-America may have been Ille "blowback"
of whal E-America was previously doing in other countries, the average Amcrican can nod his head in
whole-hearted agreement to the President's claim; it rings completely true because each time he hears or
thinks of"Amcrica" he reinterprets the meaning to one that satisfies his conscicnce. 'TIlat process is no
less natural to him than placing what pleases on his personal website, and all Illal displeases in the
trashcan icon-only this time in the computer of his mind. Thus pragmatically speaking, in the sense of
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the word as employed in linguistics, works a "debus" of monumental moral convenience.
The president's phrase makes presumptions that sound very unnatural in the gra=ar of certain
languages, and hardly conceivable as a public statement in most languages. From the perspective of
cognitive grammar, the phrase shows an extreme degree of "subjectification." In other words, there is
an enfolding or collapsing of entities, and their properties, into the subject's perspective so that conscious
awareness of distinctions between them and himself are lost. He, the viewer, is part of the perceived
"we" and both are within the onstage region of automatic good, or I-America. E-America, of course, is
also part of the true perceptual field; but is outside the president's ken; he can't believe "it" because
cognitively he cmmot see it (this was precisely his initial reaction upon first hearing the bad news); or
rather he leaves it outside ofhis perceptual focus thanks to the de-.ice of homonymic meton)my.
His statement of goodness is atemporal, nominalized, and definitional; it refers not any idea of
"irtue as something that is to be developed, or based upon doing good in the past or striven for in the
future; one simply "is" good-detenninistically transcending past and future by definition of being
American-in a platonic, "stative relation" sense rather than a process. The follo\\ing diagram (figure
5) depicts this situation modeled after Langacker (2002), \\;th a possible alternative included side by side.
V is the "iewer ("I"), P the perceived object ("we"), OS the onstage area ("I-America") and PF the
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"It's hard to believe it, but I kno\\'
we havc been good and bad."
"I can't believe it, because I know
how good we arc."
Alternatively, in terms of mental space theory, this sort of homonymic metonymy or "split
coreference," to usc Fauconnier's tenn, fosters maximal "referential opacity" and is confounded \\;th a
high degree of "reflexhity." In the folloning diagram (Figure 6), I-America is the "mental image
connector" for the role of his country and cOllntrymen in multiple le-.'els of role and value opacity. The
individual value referred to by "it" and what may have caused it does not fill the role of "his country" in
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Bush's belief space. although "it" may have in reality space. That is to say, Bush's reading of the





























r'- Role: his country = I-America
r a Role: his counlr)'
c· ... Value: E·An1crica
c • Value: USA, its people, and
their actions and events t.tw.
in\'olve both.
\\c "we" dtizcns of t:SA
The above may be easier to IJIIderstand \\ith the follo\\ing analogy. I-America and E-America are
to Bush, as "Londres" and "London" are to Pierre. a story which Saul Kripke describes, and Fauconnier
(1994) discusses. Pierre, growing up in France, hears good things about the city of Londrcs, and
believes: "Londres est jolie." Later in life he moves to England Ii\ing in the city of London, speaking
English and thus 'l\ithin his realm of experience knows that city by the name "London," which he uses in
his daily life living there. He cOllies to believe that "London is ugly" while still somehow keeping his
belief that "Londres cst jolie." Since they are distinct in his mind, his beliefs are not, in his onn mind,
contradictol')·. Like'l\ise, it seems Bush believes that what is done b)' or happens to America
(E-America), if something negative, is hardly believable; bUI America (I-America) is always believable,
good, and jolie. The similarity between Pierre and George is simply masked by the fact that unlike
Londres and London, both I-America and E-America cafl')' the same name. Nevertheless. in much the
same way, for George Bush there are Americans, and then there are les Americain.\'. This, by the way,
may shed some light on Kripke's pUZ7Je.
8, I-American, E-American
Next. let us take an example from Samuel HlJIltington of Harvard University, one of the best-read
political philosophers in America today, well-knm\n for his "Clash of CiviliLations" theory, who says:
"There is only the American dream
created by an Anglo-Protestant sociely.
Mexican-Americans \\ill share in that dream
and in that society only if they dream in English." (2004: 256)
Whal he probably means is that:
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"There is only the American dream (ofI-America)
created by an Anglo-Protestant (I-American) society.
Mexican-Americans (E-Americans) ~ill share in that dream (ofI America)
and in that society only ifthcy dream in English (thc I-language)."
In other words, they must leave behind E-America and enter the Platonic realm of I-America,
cognitive!)' transmorgrified into I-Americans down to the very depths of their dream state. According to
Huntington, despite all the ethnic intenningling in the U.S.A., and no matter how much more of it is to
come, "Anglo-Protestant Culture" will always be tlle "Cultural Core" and the superordinate metaphor of
America, symbolized by the Engljsh language. Huntington quotes a fellow academic who asserts that
America is distinguished by "the ability and willingness of an Anglo elite to stamp its image on other
peoples coming to this counlIy"(2004:59-6I}-Lc., superimposing or cross-space mapping
English-speaking, Anglo-Protestantism upon the mental space of Spanish-speaking, Mexican-Catholicism.
What we have here, according to conceptual blending, is a single scope network, but a powerful one,
which brings about a socially acceptable transformation of the E-Mexican to I-American, where E-values
are now re-equilibratcd by Anglo-Protestant I-seIlEibilities.
It is no wonder such psychological eviscerations and de-individuating pressures lead to destructive
escapism and other fonTIS of low self-awareness (see for instance Diener 1979) that have characterized
minority groups in the past or indigenous pcoples after colonization. Huntington intends no harm; he
sinlply does not realize how what he honestly believes is for the good of all is a part of an unhealthy
cognitive process. Huntington's words are only the tip of a large iceberg of similar, widely expressed
metaphorical conceptualizations about Mexican-Americans in the U.S. press (Santa Ana 2003).
Conquest occurs no longer by race, but through language; conversion occurs no longer by religion, but
through values; and cognitive dissonance is resolved by mapping future vision onto problematic present.
which then becomes a working model for fonning public opinion and policy (Figure 7 schematizes this
conceptualization of Huntington's de-individuated I-American).
9. I-Human, E-Human
9.1 Content Displacement of Container Metaphor
As pointed out by Lakoff and Johnson (1987), as well as by the psychologist Wilfred Bion (1967)
somewhat earlier, the schema of person as container seems to be a basic part of the human metaphorical
reparatory. Nevertheless, the particular epistemological assumptions and metaphorical nonTIS of a
society may more or less encourage tlle development of a "content displacing" mentality, or that of its
opposite, empathy. For instance, on an everyday level, the constant use of four letter words impl~ing
people, objects, and even life itself is just "full of sh - -"-Le., waste maltcr, is in no way helpful in
taming these content-displacing tendencies. Or consider the interaction of the platonic schema uim the
container metaphor for example, which lIlay at times produce an unsavory cognitive combination.
The proclhity to see other hUlllan beings, especially from foreign cultures, as human in shape, but
in essence animal-like and primiti\'c. often single-minded!)' fanatical, and othemisc composed of unifonn
matter-whether solid waste, gas, or liquid-may be an example of tllis phenomenon. As Pulitzer Prize
wirming New York Times foreign affairs columnist and author of the long-running bestseller The Earth is
Flat. Thomas Friedman (2005), says: "Lebanon Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia' arc "not real countries" but
simply "tribes uith flags." "They are all civil wars waiting to happen" and intervening in those
countries, such as Iraq, is like:
shaking a bottle of Champagne and then uncorking it."
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They are simply "E-matter" not even worthy as instantiations of a higher uf' -reality, as ifunable to
be contained in any sort of mcaningful, logical Fonn. Likcwise, onc of America's most renowncd
cultural anthropologists, Clifford Geertz, in his acclaimed The Inteqm:tation of Cultures, casts judgmcllt
as if assuredly from higher ground, concluding that in Indonesia:
"Things do not merely scem jumbled-they are jumbled,
and it "ill take more than theory [0 unjumble them." (2000: 228)
That is, Indonesia by nanJre, cannot be defined; it has neither recourse 10 higher reason. nor solution in
any higher theoretical Ideal It is jumbled "E-matter" "ithout any teleological pwposc.
If lucky, however, such countries or people might become (if we search for clues in Gccrtz's
writings) like his own illustrious forbcarers-"self-taught Madisons or Jeffcrsons" (2000:3*0).
Implicitly it seems, real countrics and real people, or in other words, "I-nations" and "I-humans," are
modeled upon an idea of America as the pinnaele of Wcstern chilization-despitc his well-kno\\TI
avowals to the contrary; the "E-hurrum," it appears, is he who is stffiing to be a sclf-taught I-American.
The non-American who is not striving to be so is simply E-matter with no "I" correspondence; his nation
represents no Platonic ideal, and therefore is intrinsically "jumbled" like particles swirling in a shaken
bottle of Champagne.
Thus according to Geertz, many non-western countries seem to be in essence indefinable, hardly
real: Nigeria is the "least well-defined of the generally ill defined states" Witll an "up in the air quality"
(2000:305); Lebanon is characterized by "extremely primordial diversity" (2000:297). At best. thcsc
countries correspond to a lower evolutionary stage-indeed they seem barely to have graduated from the
primordial soup once heated by volcanic actr.ity. Thus we have seething "Burmese primordial
dissidence" (2000:289) and the "primordial discolltent of the Arakanesc and the Mons," (2000:288), in
Morocco the outlying tribes have difficulty reining in their 'anarchic impulses,' (2000:297); while at least
ancient Bali had evolved to "animal barlJarism" (2000:333) and India is "waddling" (2000:289) as if a
baby; Turkey has even reached tlJe stage of an "adolescent" nation (2000:229).
Psychological research indicates that such cognitive tendencies towards "perceptual reduction"
seem to be particularly strong when mere is a motive to do so; when one is in conflict or potential conflict
of interests "ith the perceived entity (Wicklund and Steins 1996). That may involve political or
economic motive, but at times may be simply a matter of protecting one's sclf-i mage by deflating others
via a process of "egocentric contrasting."(Beauregard and Dunning 1998). That deflation is sometimes
conceived of literally, as when calling an enemy a "paper tiger," where a metaphorical collapse occurs
from three into two dimensions-the enemy is deprived of the container-metaphor itself to become
"containerless~; and a variation of this is "hollo\\ing out," or becoming an empty container as is often
applied to industrious, Asian peoples perceived as soulless "robots." A similar cogni1ive process seems
to be at work in the metaphorical transformation of an enemy into "pure" or "sheer" or "unadulterated"
C\il-as if a "ickcd substance. And this cognitive habit is no tri"ial matter: it has been observed t1Jat
such stereotypic images are a better predictor of U.S. foreign policy than objective economic and
geopolitical circumsklnces (Cottam 199*).
The proclhity to perceive others as comprised of mailer different from oneself, or on the opposite
end, having become suddenly similar to oneself, 'ia conversion to one's mm religion or one's language,
in an act of sclf-replicatiolt identity assimilation or substitution, may also be an e:\.-pression of a cognitive
tendenc:y towards coment displacement. Unfortunately, it may be said that a conscious attempt at
replacing the mental content of other nations is a key pillar in the foreign relations policy of some nations,
and leads to a noticeably unempathetic mode of international discourse.
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Figure 7. Sublimation as Conceptual Blending
Submergence: Implicit or Crypto-Metaphors
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9.2 Analogical Inference and Aristotle's Syllogistic Mantle
The Platonic schema is, however important, but one inSt:Ulce of how philosophical syslems merge
\\ith metaphors and linguistic consuuctions to shape our views and responses to the world. Other
conceptual schemas may also tend to make it easier to feel tllat some deserve justice more than others,
and tlJat there is a simple way to detennine tlJat-as found in the writings of the philosopher laureate of
the Clinton era, John Rawls. His seemingly comprehensive Aristotelian approach in The Law of Peoples
(1999), \\ith a five fold categorization of humanity, is a good example of the power of epistemological
culture and methodology to ovemhelm the unruly cries of reality.
Rawls's apparently reasonable idea of "justice as fairness," to be meted out by "reasonable, liberal
peoples" in "well-ordered democratic societies" contrasted to "outlaw" and "burdened" states, merges
marvelously with the aforemcntioned concept of the "indispensable nation." The liberal, reasonable
nation is indispensable in dctermining who arc thc outlaw states tlJat deservc punishment who arc the
burdened states in which economic imerveluion is required. and who are what Rawls calls the tolerated
"Kazanistans" of thc world, tllOse decent but socially backward nations to be Icft alonc.
Circular reasoning rcvolves among superordinate categories: I) "liberal peoples" are 2)
"reasonable" and therefore 3) "justice" follows (1999:25); which is not much different than saying
reasonable people are reasonable and therefore they act reasonably-Le., definitions derived deductively
almost like algebraic tokens in an solipsistic equation. At best, we might call it a form of inferential
reasoning that Aristotle called "apagoge," a kind of logical cxtrapolation hardened into conviction by the
reasonableness of internlediating links along the way, or what Charles Sanders Peirce (19-l0) would later
rename "abduction"-but stretched to the extreme.
In an act of moral wand-\\'a\ing. Rawls conveniently defincs away self-serving intentions in the
actions of liberal, constitutional derno..-racies (1999:-li) against other states, even if such motives are an
inseparable part of organized lnunan nature. As there is license for unilateral economic intervention., so
too there is license for military intervention. "Just war" can be waged justly only by just, well-ordered
peoples, where membership to that club of justice is determined by those just, well-ordered
people-whose governments nevertheless conduct "grave "Tongs," which however, are excused by the
need for "supreme emergency exemptiOil" Grave wrongs by others make them outlaw states; grave
\\Tongs by the "indispensable nation" arc simply "failures of statesmanship." Furt!lennore, the low
degree of concreteness and specificity of parameters means Rawls's model can be manipulated to fit
almost any sitllation, so that if ever ilie U.S. and "Kazanistan" clash, the model's control inevilably goes
to the strong. Perhaps unconsciously, that is the point of his mental exercise; for there certainly is no
section titled "Unjust War" as tllcrc is for "Jnst War."
As studies of analogical reasoning (Markham <Uld Gentner 2005, Perrott, et al 200-l) show, the
characteristics of an idealized category like tllOse above-such as "liberal peoples"-would become
associated \\ith the target analog, whether or not the target actually has those qualifications. The target
space 'absorbs' the qualities of the source domain and the mind naturally makes tlle implied inferences.
In other words, once the U.S. can reasonably bc called a "reasonable, liberal democracy," thcn its people
arc also "coopcrative," "moral," "just," and "wcll-ordered," which in turn means they wage "just war" by
definition. in a syllogistic version of "Ready, Aim. Fire."
Analogies are "primed," so as to speak, to move forward through a sequence of overlapping
categories or "cognitive platfonns" which act much Iikc launching pads for modus ponens logic. This
category and mle system is whal some coglliliYC scientists call a "weak mctllOd of reasoning" (Newell
and Sinlon 1972), and the attcmpt to disguise in generic tenus the all too ob\ious candidatc for the
"well-ordered, liberal democratic society" is rather disingenuous. Figure 8 depicts this classic example
of motivated reasoning. where our choices are pruned by what we might also call a "categorical
determinism" or "categorical fiat" guiding us along a cognitive conveyor belt on tIle path to just war.
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Figure 8. Categorical Fiat, Abductive Pyramiding, and Analogical Priming
A Coenltlye Stairway to Heayen





The Blfurcatlne Descent Into 'Categorical Purgatory'
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There is something amiss \\illl defining which people arc decent in some son of honora!)'
perpetuity according to distilled Aristotelian essence or r.uified Platonic principle, Every nation is
simultaneously both decent and indecent. or decent at times but inC\itably indecent at other
times-regardless of its political system. Meaningful justice must have an clement of open-ended
empathy that does not predetennine the focal point of compassion; fair judgment is based on the facts of
the matter at hand. not by a presumptuous pre-placing of nations in a fixed hierarchy of ethical categories,
-That is the vel)' antithesis of jurisprudence-no less so than a court of law prejudging the outcome of a
case based solely on Ille curriculum vitae of the plaintifI and defendant And in that sense, it may be
argued Rawl's The Law of Peoples is but one example of scholarship during ilie Clinton years. among
others, including Huntington's The Clash of Chilizations. for instance, that set the intellectual stage for
the military initiatives of the follo\\ing presidency.
In the final analysis, all of Rawls's definitions of peoples and international relations sinJply follow
an idealized version of the American led status quo in the era he was writing. an epoch of what may be
called 'centrifugal globalization'-<lthenYise obliquely referred to by Rawls as "Realistic Utopia.~ It is
a classic example of reforrnniating specific purpose into general abstraction for ilie sake of funhering that
specific purpose. His blending of self-made definitions, moral ought-to-bes, and claims to realism about
hypothetical situations is a nightmare of hocus-p<lcns-modus ponens. custom-made for political
manipulation. If it were not for the aura of legitirr:aC)' that Rawls's Aristotelian mantle pro\ides, we
would all see that he is a philosophical emperor with I!O clothes. Although of course, he would disagree
\\ith this ponrayal, which nevertheless is fair, if we were to follow his own style (in Rawls 1971:13),
according to a conception of fairness as justice, which naturally is to be taken no more literally than if we
were to speak of metaphor as poell)·.
10. The Semantics of Submergence
Building upon the idea that ilie mind has a vast storehouse of imaginative devices, it is not hard to
conceive that some of them are stored away in the back, out of sight Perhaps of considerable personal
value to ilie mmer of that mental storehouse, on a day·to-day basis, he may hardly be conscious of them.
Besides epistemologies and metaphors that arc socially acceptable and \\idely employed. there are also
metaphors, though historically significant and \\idely shared, Illat are no longer considered publicly
acceptable means of conceptualization. such as schemas of race, conquest, and religious conversion.
10.1 From Implicit Metaphor to Sublimating Blends
SublinJation. like so much else from psychoanalysis, has been discredited in psychology
(Baumeister et al 1998, Kubie 1962); and therefore, no one should object to a lexical orphan being
adopted here to hencefonh refer to a particular kind of conceptual blending where conscious and
unconscious conceptual clements arc integrnted into socially acceptable form that might olllcmisc be
lacking in public authority.
As originally conceived, sublimation meant ilie channeling of sexual drives into oilier acti,ity such
as artistic production. but as hinted above, it need nol be restricted to sexual motive and artistic
expression; oilier examples might be what were originally racial or religious attitudes trattsCormed into
acceptable social or scientific abstractions. The psychological origins of those ideas, on ilie conscious
level, arc left behind such that one feels having long since "graduated" from such instincts. Such is the
frame of mind of leading political scientists such as Michael Ignatieff, who claim that Blood and
Belonging (1993) arc the omnipresent obsessions ofalien cultures around ilie world, but not his O\\TI.
And while it is true tlJat ostensibly, in public, race is irrelevant in ilie United States, studies of
implicit bias (Banaji, et al. 2003, Pa)lle 2001, Eberhahardt et. al 2004, Amodio et a!. 2004) show tlJat
undemeath it is very milch alive; and furthermore, the activation and influence of sl1ch stereotypes is
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typically unconscious, automatic, and decisive (Bargll CL al. 1996, Kawakami and Dmidio 2001,
Grccnwald, Oakcs, and Hoffinan 2003). Indeed, ncuro-imaging studics, and those mcasuring
event-related brain potentials, reveal just how sensitive people are to racial differences (OOlby 2001,
Phelps and Thomas 2003, Richeson et al. 2003, Ito, Thompson, and Cacioppo 2004), and how even
policemen and avcragc test subjects arc quicker to shoot at black faces (Corrcll et al 2002) Lhan whitc
ones. They are also very sensitive to linguistic differences that are tied to racial identity (Lippi-Green
1997).
In short, r.lce is still one of thc primaJ)' means of identification among Americans, and at the same
time, regardless of nationality, emotion is always paramount when it comes to the core aspects of identity
(Kitayarna and Markus 1994, Beauregard and Dunning 1998, Fein et al. 2(03). To say evel)'one is
conscious of race as a key element in their conception of self and others, but that they perceive racial
differences \\ith a quiet emotional translucency. cOIllradicts cverything we know about self-identity; and
is no more credible than people watching the Olympics who are eX1Temely conscious of their nationality
claiming that tlley perceive national differences with a quiet cmotional transluccncy.
Race is but onc example ofa variety of unspoken yct powcrful conccptualizations which need to be
accounted for in cognitive civilization. Philosophers and historians of seience have spoken of thc
"religious unconscious" (Fuller 2004) or the "cultural mcaning" (Jacob 1997) of scientific arguments,
where the content of religion has been rcmovcd, but tlle religious framework of thought continues to
influence conceptuali7A1tions beneath grand scientific dcbates. In general, snldies show that religion
figures particularly prominently in American society compared to other developed nations (Inglehart and
Carballo 1997). That is to sa)~ religious modes of thinking are a \ital part of thc accepted socio-cultural
milieu. Sublimation has traditionally been characterized as a constructive mechanism, of which it often
is, but it can also become the cover for thc continued influencc of factors in scholarship or politics whose
cxistcnce becomcs obscured.
10.2 The Self as a Project of Broad Knowledge Construction
To summarize by naming just a few researchers from English sources alone, the ever-increasing
discoveries concerning: 1) the "cognitive unconscious" (Kihlstrom, Bargh, Wegner) \\ith its
"nonconscious goals" (Goll\\itzer), "implicit biases" (Banaji), and "implicit theories" (Dweck, Ross);
where 2) the self works to shape "autobiographicalmemol)'" (Conway) and is also shaped by "motivatcd
mcmory" (Singcr) invol\ing "directcd forgetting" (Myers and Bre\\in) and mcmory inhibition by
"cxccutive contro!" (Baddeley, Anderson)-not only regarding the seU: but collectively, in a society's
reconstruction of its historical past (Schacter)-compounded by 3) Mmotivated reasoning" (Kunda),
"self-seT\ing information processing" (Hippel), and the imperative of defending "self-esteem"
(Baumeister) through "self enhancemcnt" (Sedikides), which at times entails the deception of others
(DePaulo, Paulhus) and even of thc self (DlUming, Hirstein) modulated by 4) "superordinate goal
hierarchies" (Carver and Scheier) and "possible selves" (Markus}-all the above, \\ithin a \\idening
panorama of research ranging from subliminal perception to overarcbing life slr.ltegies-point to the
importance of often unconscious or unfulfilled psychological preoccupations and the self-concept as an
ongOing project ofbroad know/edge construction.
That is to say, our sense of self evalves from thc intcraction between the unconscious and our cntire
epistemological basc \\ilh which we undcrstand the world, These discoverics need to bc accounted for
in any thCOI)' of mind that strives to rcflect psychological realities or be in the vcI)' least way
comprehensive. And thus we arrive at "sublimation," recast as a form ofcumlliative. implicif conceptual
blending, giving these various theories a much needed cohcrence by encapsulating the general bridging
mechanism betwccn unconscious process and conscious cognitive endeavor.
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11. Concluding Comments
The changes in how we think as a socicty, how we \icw right and \\Tong, and how we interpret the
world around us that becomes the basis for historical change-Le., the grand flow of intellectual
history-is normally conceived along thc lines of scientific progress, despite the onslaught of
postmodernist thinking in the late 20111 century. Whatcvcr mistakcs we might makc along the way, wc
are wc hope, overall, advancing in thc complcxity and \\isdom with which we undcrstand the world and
ourselves. Leaps in technology and slartling discoveries, addcd to our ever-growing accumulation of
knowledge guided by disinterestcd scholars, push us furthcr along the path of intellcctual maturity in a
process largely separatc from daily and world events--or so it seems. But thc kcy mechanisms in
cognition, \icwcd from thc S)nthesized perspectivc of mental space thcoT); cognitivc grammar, and social
ncuroscience-not to mention social psychology. cross-eultural studies, and critical discourse
analysis-hold no guarantees that man will usc them for the bellcr; rather, he will use them to makc
himself feel betier, which is not the same thing.
Shin); emcrging structures of knowledge may become transfonned or co-opted in ways which lead
us down dark paths; and worthy ideas submcrgc whcn they clash dissonantly with thc world situation as
wc would like to see it. Cognitivc cohcsion is sought after at all costs; from thc time in fact, we are
small children tT)ing out our cognitive-gr.lIlunatical apparatus; and tlle first step towards a bener world is
for us to realize that less popular ways of viewing the world, compared to the most popular ways, arc not
less popular because tller are less likely to be valid, only less cohesive with the way things already arc.
Although human cognition is based in thc biology of the brain, perhaps the s,l\ing grace is that these
epistemologies and superordinate metaphors, and me canonical autltority they claim, arc painstaldngly
constntetcd, culturally mediated, and timc bound; they are not absolutes-univcrsal, timeless, and
inevitable-as their proponcnts would insistcntly have us beliC\·c; and simply awakcning to that fact is a
big step forward towards moral rcstitution.
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Appendix
A. Psychodynamics, Cognition, and Language
While p0l1ions of psychoanalytic theory have not been borne out by recent evidence, nevertheless,
like all disciplines, there are always elements timt Imve stood the test of time tlmt are useful. So great,
however, had been the aversion to psychoanalysis at the turn of the 21st century in Anglo-American
intellectual circles, that even psychology itself had all but disassociated itself from it, picking up from the
\\Teckage elements renamed and repacked into more scientific sounding labels. But now that the
shortcomings of psychoanalysis have been made blushingly clear to us, and its idols have been toppled,
we should be able to better utilize what remains in a balanced fashion.
For whatever the exact topology of the unconscious-whether it should be considered in one, two,
or three parts-it is no less real than once uncharted lands of which we had only knowledge of the
coastline delta and the birds from the interior that fly overhead. Suffice that there is a psychological
interior, and we must acknowledge it. Indeed, some researchers claim that the illusion is not the
unconscious, but that of conscious will (Wegner 2002); and a large body of research is growing which
indicates unconscious influences work powerfully upon thought and language in ways more complex and
sophisticated tl1an even Freud imagined; some call it the "New Unconscious" (Hassin, Uleman, Bargh
2005).
Likewise, however we might speculate about tile nature of self-identity, the fact that we do defend,
expand, or define our sense of self is undeniable, no less than we can deny a sense of self to a playful
child floundering under the covers of a bed, hidden from our sight Autobiographical memory and
self-narrative, pragmatic supposition and le:\ical connotation, are all tied to our sense of self. Motive,
emotion, and unconscious elements of cognition are within the realm of scientific and common
e:\-perience. They demand e:\-planation, and we should salvage what is useful in helping us make sense
out of the linguistic habitat that surrounds us.
Psychoanalysis, of course, is keenly aware of cognitive disorders arising from emotional turmoil,
while cognitive science and linguistics keeps its distance from them, emphasizing the triumphs of the
noIDlal1y functioning human mind. There seems to be an implicit understanding that cognitive 'science'
is to skirt anything beyond straightforward •emotions'--explicit expressions of emotion-lest it be mired
in a bog of irrationality. However the opposite is true; by connecting tile rich clinical database of case
studies and the conceptual deptll of psychoanalysis to ilie mechanics of cognitive science, a better
"categorical metanlorphosis~-to employ Fauconuier and Turner's term (2002:269) may emerge. Some,
as Eric Kandel, fanlOUS for Iris work on tile neurophysiology of memory, advocate a neuroscientific
approach to psychoanalysis, in a new "biology ofthe mind" (Kandel 2005) as Freud origiually conceived
of doing, but gave up on. Others, in an approach tl1at gained in popularity towards tile end of the 20 ll,
century, applied cognitive science to tile study of the unconscious or to psychiatry, as a metllod of
indi\idual psychotherapy (Hilgard 1977, Erdelyi 1985, Shervrin 1996, Stein 1997, Bucci 1997, Horowitz
1998, Clark and Beck 1999), each \\itll their 0\1TI clinical focus, conceptual mist, and terminology of
psychodynamics.
The idea that linguistic and pS)'chodynamic mechanisms may be similar has been suggested by
Jacques LaC'dll (1968, 1977) who interpreted the unconscious like a language, \iewing Freud's idea of
"displacement" as a form of metonymy; and "condensation" as the unconscious mind's use of metaphor.
George Lakoff (1997) has also pointed Ollt that Freud's idea of symbolization is similar to conceptual
metaphor, and "reversal" is analogous to the concept of "irony." Even Ray Jackendoff (1988), has
discussed common points that may underlie psychodynamic conceptual structures and linguistic processes.
In particular, he points out a widespread phenomena of "erroneous displacement followed by
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regularization" referring to, for instance, slips of the tongue that follow consistent but unconsciously
adhered to pallems, and postulates parallel patterns in disturbances of unconscious and emotional
reactions.
But here we suggest somewhat the reverse: apply psychodynamic principles to cognitive linguistics
itsclf, such as conceptual blending theor)' and cognitive grammar, 10 glean insighl inlo complex cognition
and how we, as part of a sociel)"s \\ider intellectual arena. foml concepts which becomc the basis of
moral decision-making and political action.
B. Emotionally Charged Blending
Conceptual blcnding alone, where a person is presented "ith a stimulating jlL'\1aposition of
concepts through a combination of \isua) or lingnistic signals prompted from the outside, such as the
pluasc "skiing waitcr" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002:21), that trigger amalgamating associations, eatmot
account for the totalil)' of the phenomenon we are confronting. Nor does motivated transfercncc, where
a emotional neediness from \\ithin that takes on emotionally charged life of its O\\TI, and searches for a
projectivc outlct, suffice as an cxplanation. More is needed than conceptual blending or cognitivc
dissonance alone to gain a full sensc of why and how satisf)ing ethical meaning is created. The focus of
attention in the two fields is different. and both are necessary for a satisfactol)' explieation.
In Fauconnian style cross-space-mapping, mental spaces, figuratively speaking, are all pervaded by
the sallie emotional climate; like pockets of void \\ith elaborale geometric coordinates and interstices,
they have no color, warmth, nor weight They are much like mathematical spaces of the topological
kind. 11mt is to say, mental space and blending theory emphasizes configurations and interactions
between thosc spaces: their base, viewpoint, focus, access, match, web, opacit)', grammatieality, and so
forth. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, probes the motivation that makes certain spaces more potent in
our imagination than others. Cognitive linguistics has done much 10 show how the lines and S\\itches
are laid: and psychoanalysis has something to olTer in ~xplainingwhy the current flows in the direction it
does.
"Meta-transference" which combines them. is charged blending, or emotionally electrified cross
mapping. To put it in another way, the theory of mental spaces does not account for the motivational
force churning the conceptual blend; and psychological transference does not account for the specific,
structural face upon which emotions are projected. It is only by considering the parallel processing of
the two, with our eyes also on the larger epistemological framework, that we glean how a transfixing
construction of potent meaning occurs, and how that new conS1ructiOn, in that particular fonn, was choscn
as the object of moral projection.
B.1 Projective Identification and Conceptual Compression
When conceptual blends are emotionally charged. a common cognitive mechanism underlies the
process of "cross space mapping" and what Freud and Jung called "projection," where critical elements of
identity, persorolity, and emotion are vested into another person or object. sometimes accompanied by
beha,ioral symptoms of infatuation or obsession, as in the particular casc of projection ealled
"transference." But in conceptual or meta-transfercnce emotional elements are rearranged into, or
transferred onto, new and abstract moral conceptualizations, rather than on to a particular person or object
as is often the casc in psychoanalysis. Projective identification is somewhat paralleled by Fauconnier
and Turner's (2002) idea of identil)' integration by "compression" or "sclective .projection"-whcrc
particular aspects of concepts are highlighted at the e.'\llCllSC of oUler characteristics, to form what they
call a conceptual blcnd.
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In light of everyday linguistic phenomcna, these concepts of compression and projective
identification are similar to the process of metonymic identification, such as when a symbolic part of
something comes to represent a whole, or a larger concepL The phenomenon of childhood phonological
"coalescence," where phonemes from different syllables are compressed into a single syllable may be
worth mentioning for added perspective,
B.2 Defensive SplittingjDisassoeiation and Conceptual Disintegration/Decompression
In defensive splitting, a person distinguishes as two or more separate entities the desirable and
undesirable aspccts within himself or of what he experiences as a mechanism to reduce his anxiety and
suffering, The idea of splitting has its analogy in what Fauconnier and Turner (2002) call
"disinlegration," (the counterpart to integration), where certain attributes of inputs in a conceptual blend
are held off to allow the blend to "gel" properly, that is to function as a concept
While Freud emphasized the fundamental human drive as primarily "pleasure seeking," the Object
Relations School sees it as primarily "object seeking," and emphasizes the overriding importance of
internalized objects, Thus instead of mental "spaces," the dynamic structure of mental "objects" are
emphasized, And while we may dispute Klein (1975) or Fairbairn's (1952) attribution of the causes of
splitting, there is no doubt we do internalize people and objects, which come to callY on a vhid mental
existence and whose emotional responses they evoke play a role in our understanding of the matrix of
background information that are crucial in establishing how we think. Our own fathers, mothers,
siblings, friends and foes for instance, undoubtedly shape our global, generic comprehension of concepts
such as father, mother, sibling, friend and foe.
Along with the defensive splitting of the dcsired from the undesired parts of oneself, is the denial
or jettisoning of, or disassociation from, those undesirable but nevertheless integral parts of a person or
his experience that are a source of discomfort or displeasure. Disassociation is paralleled by what in
conceptual blending theor:y is called "decompression," the mechanism of disintegrating or distancing
certain conceptual certain elements of input spaces in order to arrive at a bener functioning blend.
However, unlike denial or disassociation in psychoanalysis, which presupposes a strong emotional
motivation, in the case of"decompression" the mind chooses "neutrally" among conceptually attributes in
order to create a feasible blend, discarding some characteristics as non-fitting cognitive items like faulty
parts or a student who tosses out redundant information placed in verbal math problems in a school
textbook.
Linguistically speaking, the ideas of splitting/disassociation, disintegration/decompression, as well
as mental blocking and suppression, all find a conunonplace analogy in the nollna1ly functioning mind's
ability to automatically keep polysemic meanings of a homonym separate in our consciousness, or left in
unconsciousness-to rum off, so as to speak, inappropriate or undesired meanings_ Controlled studies
of "hypermnesia" (Erde!}i 1984), or the recovery of consciously inaccessible memor)', also points to an
intriguing aspect of this mitching and separating cognitive mechanism.
C. Neurolinguistie Indications
The principle of nnderl}ing correlation applies to proven emotional-cognitive links from the days
of Stanley Schachter (1962) to more recent fOl1llulatiolls in brain science popularized by Damasio (1994)
and LeDou:... (1996). As for the links between general cognition and linguistics, while any re>iew of the
recent neuro-Iinguistic literarurc shows noticeable differences in the brain's processing of nouns and
verbs (Shapiro et aI. 2005, Fedel1lleier cl al. 2000, Pulvcl1Iliiller, Lutzenberger, and Preissl 1999,
Darnasio and Tranel 1993), at the same time, whether measuring e>'ent related potentials (ERPs) or
comparing neuro-images (PET, MRI). a great degree of functional overlap seems to exist between
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language, motor, and visual systems (Demonet, Thierry, and Cardebat 2005, Blank et al. 2002,
Kellenbach et al. 2002, FriedeIici 2001, Tyler et al. 20lll) with neural acthity ranging over a variety of
brain regions, especially when it comes to processing abstract, metaphorical, or elliot ion laden phrases
(Schmidl Debuse, and Seger 2005, CalO et al. 2004, Craik et al. 1999).
Simply hearing action verbs activates motor representations and working memo!)' structures
necessary to actually perform tIlOse behaviors (Pulvermiiller et a1. 2005, Tettamanti et al. 2005); verbal
control of action has been investigated (Baddeley, et a1. 2001); and observation of action activates the
same brain area as does retrieval of action verbs from memory (1cannerod 1999), indicating the
interrelated nature of motor function and verbal mC2Iling of that function (Grezes and Decety 200 Il.
Thus it is becoming clear that there are automatic, nooconscious connections between verbal and
bcha\ioral representations in the brain. These correspondences arc likely tied to tIlC work of so-called
~mirror neurons" found in the brain. but an in-depth analysis of that topic is beyond the scope of this
discussion (Sec for instance, Arbib 2004 for an overview). Suffice it to say that how we Iinguistical{i'
interpret things stimulates the same areas as how we physically do things, an idea \\itIl interesting ethical
implications.
Some researchers conclude "there is no single Deural marker of word class" and word class based
dissociations are ~likely to be a function of both the l)pe of stimulus and the context in which it occurs"
(Fedemleier et al. 2000). That is to say, grammatical categories seem to be intrinsically linked to basic
sensory and motor functions in a synthesis of syntax and serilantics, tied to fundamental mechanisms of
cognition in a striking display of non-modularity. \\o1ille there are recogni7~ble differcnces of acti\ity
pattern between grammatical categories (and of course certain parts of the brain are more involved in
language processing tIlan others), at the same time, those brain pattcms revcal a wide regional distribution
into areas that overlap with bolll higher cortical and lower sensory-motor function. Neuroscience, in
other words, seems to be indicating the validil)' of the cognitive-linguistic approach.
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